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The present study aimed to expand on previous research that explains when affect can influence 
subsequent judgments in an incongruent way. It also investigated a context where a negative 
emotion may have been maintained in order to achieve a subsequent goal. Participants in a guilt, 
shame, and control condition visualized past events. Those in the guilt and shame condition 
wrote about a time when they committed a moral transgression and were instructed to write an 
apology letter to a person they hurt. They then rated themselves on a number of interpersonal 
traits as a way to measure self-enhancement. I hypothesized that those in the guilt condition 
would self-enhance on interpersonal traits as a result of feeling guilt, which is a repair-focused 
emotion that has been shown to benefit interpersonal relationships. I also hypothesized that 
participants in the guilt condition would express a desire to maintain their feelings of guilt as a 
strategy to help them write an apology letter. The present findings do not support my hypotheses.  
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When it Feels Good to be Bad: The Effect of Guilt on Self-Enhancement 
Emotions and moods influence countless aspects of daily life. Positive and negative 
affects have implications for the self and interpersonal interactions. They also have an effect on 
cognition. People tend to learn and recall more information that is congruent with their affect. It 
has also been shown that affect can color subsequent judgments in a congruent way. If someone 
is happy, then he or she will positively evaluate certain aspects of his or her environment. Early 
work on moods supported mood-congruency by showing moods can increase the availability of 
mood-congruent thoughts or information in memory (Bower, 1981). Almost all theories of mood 
and emotion and their effects on judgments are theories about mood congruence.  
However, some research suggests that moods are not always congruent with judgments. 
What if you want to watch a sad love story and it ends up making you happy? Your happy mood 
may lead to a negative judgment about the sad story (Martin, Abend, Sedikides, & Green, 1997). 
What if you are angry about a social injustice? Your negative mood may lead you to make more 
positive judgments about your concern for the disenfranchised because staying angry could be a 
way of showing your concern for justice. It is known that in some contexts mood will affect 
judgments in congruent ways, but research has begun to examine the contexts in which mood 
influences judgments in incongruent ways. More recent theories have begun to create 
frameworks that can explain congruent and incongruent judgments. 
The present research will explore a context where affect may influence judgments in an 
incongruent way. It will specifically explore how self-judgments are influenced by affect. The 
current study will look at how a negative affective state heretofore unexamined empirically—
guilt—may influence self-judgments in ways that may be self-enhancing. Specifically, I will be 
looking at how guilt influences self-judgments in an incongruent way and if people, at times, 
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choose to maintain feeling guilty.  
Affect 
Moods and emotions are both affective states, but differ in important ways. Moods are 
more state-focused and do not have a salient object. Moods may be even more likely to relate to 
misattributions because their source is typically not known or salient. Emotions are affective 
states focused on the valence of events, actions, or objects relevant to the person feeling them 
(Clore, Wyer, Dienes, Gasper, Gohm, & Isbell, 2001). Emotions tend to be shorter-lived and 
more intense than moods (Larsen, 2000). As a result, people are usually conscious of the source 
of their emotions, but less sure why they are feeling a particular mood.  
 A situation where an emotion would be felt over a mood could be when someone 
performs well at work and is congratulated by his or her boss; he or she may feel pride as a result. 
The person would know where this feeling is originating. Moods can have many unknown 
sources. One early study on mood and helping behavior found that people helped a stranger more 
after they found a dime in a phone booth slot (Isen & Levin, 1972). The mild influence of the 
unexpected dime put them in a good mood.  
Guilt and Shame 
The current study will look at how two emotions, guilt and shame, influence self-
judgments. Specifically, I will investigate how people will rate themselves when they feel guilt 
and shame. Moreover, guilt and shame are part of a special class of emotions termed the self-
conscious emotions. Shame, embarrassment, pride, social anxiety, nostalgia, and guilt are 
regarded as the self-conscious emotions. They require self-awareness and occur when people 
reflect on their self-representations. Self-conscious emotions are not only the result of self-
reflection and self-evaluation; they can involve the individual assessing a situation from another 
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real or imagined person’s point of view (Leary, 2007). Guilt and shame are the first self-
conscious emotions to be studied from this approach of mood and emotion.  
Empirically, guilt has been found to be an affective state with a focus on particular 
behaviors involving the perception that one has harmed someone or something (Lewis, 1971). It 
can also be thought of as a motivated state that contains thoughts or intended behaviors 
acknowledging a violation of social standards and a need to offer an apology or make amends 
(Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2007; Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000; Kugler & 
Jones, 1992). Shame is both similar to and different than guilt. Shame is defined as an affective 
state associated with negative evaluations of the global self after violating a moral standard.  
Shame and guilt can both be felt across a number of situations; both are self-conscious 
moral emotions, and empirically there is overlap between the two emotions, yet they remain 
distinct. Some early research grouped guilt and shame together, but there is now strong evidence 
to the contrary (Tangney, 1995). Although it is often discussed along with shame, guilt has very 
different implications for the self. Guilt involves the self’s negative evaluations of a specific 
behavior, whereas shame is a negative evaluation of the entire self (Lewis, 1971; Tracy & 
Robins, 2004).  Guilt is comprised of negative behavior evaluations (e.g., thinking one’s actions 
were wrong) and approach behaviors. Shame is comprised of negative self-evaluations and 
avoidance behaviors (Wolf, Cohen, Panter, & Insko, 2010). 
Carver and Scheier have created a model of self-regulation that describes an approach 
system and an avoidance system that is helpful to differentiate between approach and avoidance 
behaviors (1990, 1998, 2008). The approach system, based on a model by Gray (1994), is termed 
the behavioral action system (BAS) and controls movement towards a goal or behavior. The 
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avoidance system, or the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), motivates inhibition of movements 
towards behaviors that may lead to negative outcomes.    
Building off of the Carver and Scheier (1990, 1998, 2008) model, Sheikh and Janoff-
Bulman (2010) propose a self-regulatory framework that helps to clarify the differences between 
shame and guilt. Proscriptive regulation and prescriptive regulation are two forms of moral 
regulation that are based on approach and avoidance motivations. They define proscriptive 
morality as a system that restrains immoral conduct and is based on the avoidance system 
(Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). Under this system, people focus on avoiding bad behaviors such as 
harming someone or something. Prescriptive morality promotes moral conduct and is based on 
an approach system. Under this system, people promote moral behaviors such as helping 
someone. In other words, “proscriptive regulation focuses on what we should not do, whereas 
prescriptive regulation focuses on what we should do,” (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010, p. 214). 
The two systems map onto the way shame and guilt are regulated. Shame is related to 
proscriptive regulation and is activated when we have done something we should not have. Guilt 
is related to prescriptive regulation and is activated when we have failed to do something we 
should have. A proscriptive failure, such as excessive gambling, activates shame. A prescriptive 
failure, such as failing to tip a good waiter, activates guilt.  
The authors found that being higher on an avoidance orientation predicted more shame 
proneness, but not guilt proneness. Similarly, being higher on an approach orientation predicted 
guilt proneness, but not shame proneness. An experiment supported this pattern: priming an 
avoidance orientation increased shame, whereas priming approach orientation increased guilt 
(Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). In addition, after recalling past events, participants reported 
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that transgressions that activated proscriptive regulation brought up more shame than guilt, 
whereas transgressions that activated prescriptive regulation engendered more guilt than shame.  
What is the experience of someone feeling guilt or shame? Guilt is uncomfortable, but it 
is motivating because of its focus on reparative action. Shame tends to be more painful, because 
it focuses on criticizing the entire self. Interpersonal guilt is positive in the sense that it requires 
empathy (Hoffman, 1982) and is associated with approach-oriented, prosocial actions to make up 
for the transgression. A person needs other-oriented empathy in order to be aware that he or she 
is the cause of another’s distress. It shows he or she has the cognitive capabilities to be 
successful at perspective taking and possesses the affective capabilities to experience the range 
of emotions that empathy requires (Feshbach, 1975).  
When recalling experiences of shame, participants reported blushing, higher distress 
levels, and feeling self-conscious and small. When recalling experiences of guilt, individuals 
reported having done something wrong, wishing their actions could be undone, inflicting self-
punishment, hoping for forgiveness, and the desire to reconcile the situation (Roseman, West, & 
Swartz, 1994; Wolf et al., 2010). Shame proneness is positively correlated with neuroticism, 
personal distress, and low self-esteem, whereas guilt proneness is positively correlated with 
empathic concern, perspective taking, and subscription to conventional morality (Wolf et al., 
2010). Recalling instances of shame and having shame proneness as part of one’s personality are 
maladaptive in several ways. Recalling guilt and guilt proneness are more adaptive. This idea 
supports the notion that guilt and shame affect the self in different and important ways. When 
feeling these emotions people they may think differently about themselves. 
A study by Leith and Baumeister (1998) demonstrated that global empathy was 
correlated with guilt-proneness, but not shame-proneness. Guilt-proneness was strongly 
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correlated with perspective taking, and shame-proneness predicted personal distress. In 
additional studies, participants recalled their experience of an interpersonal conflict from the last 
six months. They were later told to think of themselves as the other person and relive the 
experience. Better perspective taking was associated with guilt-dominated stories and guilt-prone 
people. Shame had no significant effect. Guilt and shame appear to have different effects when it 
comes to thinking about interpersonal conflict.  
When feeling guilty, a person is concerned with criticizing his or her own behavior. The 
self is not being criticized as it is when feeling shame (Lewis, 1971; Tracy & Robins, 2004). In 
other words, thinking “I am a bad person” is linked to shame, whereas “I did a bad behavior” is 
linked to guilt. A series of studies supports Lewis’s (1971) self-behavior distinction between 
shame and guilt. Researchers examined the two in terms of counterfactual thinking (Niedenthal, 
Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994). Participants in one study described a personal shame or guilt 
experience; they then counterfactualized the event by listing factors that may have caused a 
different outcome. After researchers coded responses for whether aspects of the self, behavior, or 
situation were “undone” they found that in shame experiences participants were more likely to 
want to undo aspects of the self, whereas in the guilt experience they were more likely to undo 
aspects of the behavior.   
 The evaluation of self or behaviors is just one way to differentiate between the two 
related emotions. Another theoretical distinction that early researchers focused on was 
distinguishing between the private and public context when referring to guilt and shame. They 
proposed that guilt is seen as a private emotion, whereas shame is seen as a public emotion 
(Benedict, 1946). Some think shame is contingent upon other people knowing about one’s 
wrongdoings, whereas guilt can be felt solely in the individual and other people may never know 
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one violated a social standard (Gehm & Scherer, 1988).  The public-private distinction is 
commonly talked about, but until recently there was not much empirical support for it (Tangney, 
Marschall, Rosenberg, Barlow, & Wagner, 1994).  Wolf and colleagues (2010) took a closer 
look at these distinctions.  
Wolf and colleagues (2010) point out that Lewis (1971) does not dismiss the public-
private distinction entirely. They state that the self-behavior distinction that Lewis makes for 
shame versus guilt indicates the type of evaluation the individual makes. The public-private 
distinction indicates the situation in which the transgression occurred. Wolf and colleagues 
(2010) tested whether the public-private and self-behavior theoretical distinctions both deserve 
attention. Many measures of guilt and shame proneness only look at self-behavior 
conceptualizations. They examined the relationships among five shame and guilt proneness 
inventories (each with a guilt and shame subscale) to assess the constructs the inventories 
measured in order to determine whether the different conceptualizations are compatible or 
incompatible. Four of the inventories followed the public-private distinction (Anxiety Attitude 
Survey, Perlman, 1958; Beall Shame–Guilt Test, Beall, 1972; Measure of Susceptibility to Guilt 
and Shame, Cheek & Hogan, 1983; Dimensions of Conscience Questionnaire, Johnson, Danko, 
Huang, Park, Johnson, & Nagoshi, 1987) and one followed the self-behavior distinction 
(TOSCA-3, Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000).  
Wolf and colleagues (2010) conducted a confirmatory factor analysis and they found that 
the five guilt proneness subscales from each inventory were associated with a Guilt Proneness 
Factor and the five shame proneness subscales were associated with a Shame Proneness Factor. 
They also found that the two-factor model of the 10 subscales fit significantly better than the 
one-factor model. This indicated that the public-private and self-behavior distinctions could fit 
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together. These results show that the public-private and self-behavior conceptualizations 
empirically share much in common and that both help to show that shame and guilt proneness 
are distinct constructs (Wolf et al., 2010). These findings are in the context of measurement, 
meaning that shame proneness can be better measured if the scenario is public, whereas guilt 
proneness is best measured as the tendencies of making approach responses in private scenarios.  
The topic of guilt in social psychology research was largely ignored up until the early 
nineties (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Guilt gained more attention after it was 
considered from an interpersonal approach. Originally, Freud and other early psychologists 
viewed guilt as a predominantly intrapersonal emotion. Freud thought that intrapersonal conflicts 
were the source of guilt (1930/1961; 1933/1964). In Freud’s theory, the superego acts as the 
conscience and is motivated to always be moral. The id motivates the desire to act on pleasure. 
The ego acts as a mediator between the two competing desires.  Freud believed the superego 
used guilt to sway the actions of the ego. Guilt was seen as causing psychological distress and 
problems with adjustment because of needing to respond to one’s unacceptable impulses. The 
focus was on the negative intrapersonal effects of guilt.  
The work by Baumeister and colleagues (1994) highlights the positive interpersonal 
nature of guilt. They argue that guilt often results from an interpersonal interaction and it holds 
relationship-enhancing functions. There is no doubt that guilt is beneficial in terms of motivating 
reparative action towards the source of the tension. However, it is crucial that the intrapersonal 
aspects of guilt do not get ignored as the interpersonal ones once were. Restoring relationships, 
as a result of feeling guilt, indirectly benefits the self. The current study is focusing on the 
positive intrapersonal side of guilt by looking at the positive implications feelings of guilt can 
have on self-judgments. Guilt can lead to reparative action, but it also might lead to more 
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positive self-judgments under some circumstances. A person feeling guilt may recognize that he 
or she feels upset while also recognizing this feeling is the result of caring about another person 
or his or her own moral standards. That is, he or she may use his or her guilty feelings as input to 
render self-judgments and may in fact render more positive self-judgments relative to a situation 
in which he or she is not feeling guilt.  
Recent evidence suggests that the interpersonal reparative actions that guilt motivates 
may also have great intrapersonal effects. Restoring interpersonal relationships indirectly 
benefits the self, but there may be more direct benefits as well. One study illustrated this point by 
examining how participants responded when they were denied the opportunity to compensate for 
damaging social bonds (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). Participants in a guilt condition imagined 
they were going to cost their parents more college tuition money after failing a final exam they 
did not study for before winter break. In a control condition, participants imaged failing the exam 
because the questions did not relate to the class. Those in a repair condition were told they could 
take the exam again in the spring semester. Those in a no-repair condition were told they would 
have to take the exam the following year after re-enrolling in the course. They then reported their 
intentions of going on a ski trip with their friends over the break.  
Participants in the guilt condition with no opportunity to repair the harm they caused their 
parents were less likely to report joining their friends on the ski trip compared to those in the 
control condition who had a repair opportunity. Those in the control condition with a repair 
opportunity reported no more intention to go than those in the control without a repair 
opportunity and those in the guilt condition with a repair opportunity. The authors termed this 
effect of guilt causing self-punishment the “Dobby effect,” after a character in the Harry Potter 
series who punished himself for minor infractions by hitting his head against walls.  
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In a second study, participants showed evidence for the Dobby effect in a controlled 
experiment (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). Participants participated in three rounds of what they 
were told was a visual acuity task. Over 10 trials, they looked at a number of dots and circles that 
were impossible to count. They then were told to concentrate on the number of dots and make an 
estimate. Every accurate estimate earned them 10 points to use towards entrance to a lottery. The 
experimenter already predetermined whether or not they gave an accurate estimate for each trial 
in each round. In the first round, they were told they answered seven correctly (earning them 70 
points). In the second round, they were told they were earning points for a partner. In the control 
condition, they and their partner both answered eight correctly. In the guilt condition, their 
partner earned them 80 points by answering eight correctly and they only earned their partner 20 
points. In the third round, participants received 10 points for every correct answer and had points 
deducted for every wrong answer. Participants decided for themselves how many points would 
be deducted. In the No-Repair condition, the points were deducted from their total points. The 
more points they deducted indicated more self-punishment. In the repair condition, the number 
of points they deducted was given to their partner. They found higher levels of self-punishment 
by guilty participants in the No-Repair condition. The Dobby effect shows that guilt motivates 
positive interpersonal behavior, but it also has important implications for the self. If the 
opportunity for repair is not available, then the positive interpersonal effects are lost along with 
any benefit to the self. This evidence for how much intrapersonal distress guilt can cause when 
people cannot repair adds further support for the need to continue examining the positive 
intrapersonal effects of guilt when it is felt at a time where repair opportunities are not salient.  
Affect and Information 
 There are a number of theories positing how affect influences judgment. The vast 
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majority of these theories use a congruence approach to explain the influence of affect. They 
assume negative affect leads to negative evaluations and positive affect leads to positive 
evaluations. The current study explores a context where emotions can influence judgments in an 
incongruent way. Previous research has failed to study the ways that experiencing guilt and 
shame can influence judgments in congruent or incongruent way. The current study focuses 
specifically on how guilt and shame influence self-judgments.   
Affect-as-Information. The affect-as-information approach is commonly used to explain 
how affect influences judgments. According to the affect-as-information theory, people have a 
tendency to misattribute their affect to the judgment at hand (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  When 
asking themselves “How do I feel about this situation?” people rely on the valence of their 
feelings to make an attribution. According to this theory, mood congruent evaluations are 
generated when individuals mistake aspects of their mood for their reaction to a target. An 
example of this would be if a person were to listen to a sad song on their way to work and 
subsequently be asked how their day is going. They may report having a bad day when in reality 
they just feel a negative mood from the song.  
The affect-as-information theory only accounts for times when affect is used as 
information in a congruent way: positive affect is used as information to render more positive 
judgments, whereas negative affect is used as information to render more negative judgments. 
The theory takes the context of one’s mood into consideration only by allowing for the 
discounting of one’s mood to salient nontarget causes (Martin & Davies, 1998). One classic 
study supporting the affect-as-information theory had participants rate their life satisfaction in 
situations where they had an opportunity to attribute their mood to an external source (Schwarz 
& Clore, 1983). In the first study, happy or sad mood was induced by participants recalling vivid 
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descriptions of a happy or sad event in their recent past. Participants completed the experiment in 
a soundproof room. Some were told that the room might make them feel good and others were 
told they might feel bad. After the mood induction, they completed a bogus “sound-memory 
task,” life satisfaction and happiness scales, and present mood scales. 
Participants reported more satisfaction and happiness with life in general when in a good 
mood than when in a bad mood. Those in a good mood were not influenced by the possible 
situational explanation. However, when those in the bad mood were able to attribute their 
feelings to the external source they were told would make them feel bad, the effect of the bad 
mood was eliminated. Those in the bad mood condition reported more happiness and life 
satisfaction when they were able to attribute these feelings to the room compared to those that 
were not told the room would make them sad. They also no longer differed from those in the 
good-mood condition. Those in the bad-mood condition that were told the room would make 
them feel good did not report significantly more happiness than those that were told nothing 
about the room. They also reported significantly less happiness that those in the good-mood 
condition with the same expectations that the room would make them feel good.  
Schwarz and Clore (1983) replicated these findings using a more naturalistic setting as 
well. In a second study, participants answered questions about life satisfaction, happiness, and a 
desire to change over the phone on either warm, sunny days or rainy days. They were also 
randomly assigned to conditions in reference to the weather. Participants were either casually 
asked how the weather was, were told the study was specifically concerned with how weather 
affects mood, or no mention of the weather was made. Participants felt happier, satisfied, and 
showed less desire to change on sunny days compared to rainy days as a result of the weather 
influencing their mood. This was consistent across conditions. When participants were made 
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aware of the weather by experimenters, they were more likely to attribute their mood to the 
weather; consequently, the negative impact of the bad mood was eliminated.  Those in the 
conditions in which attention was directed at the weather did not show differences on sunny 
compared to rainy days in life satisfaction, happiness, or desire to change. Participants’ responses 
in both studies show support for the affect-as-information theory. Participants allowed their 
momentary affective states to influence judgments about their life satisfaction and happiness. By 
being able to attribute their negative mood to an external factor they were able to attenuate the 
negative effect of bad moods.  
This example shows that the affect-as-information theory only mentions how affective 
states influence judgments in a congruent way. It is unable to explain judgments that are 
incongruent with affect. Guilt has been shown to have a number of interpersonal benefits. As a 
result of it benefiting interpersonal relationships, it may also have a positive influence on the self 
under certain conditions. The affect-as-information theory would not be able to account for 
feelings of guilt influencing self-judgments in a positive way. Most of the research has only 
focused on moods and use mood and affect interchangeably. It is unclear where they make the 
distinction between mood and emotion; as a result it is unclear how emotions act as information. 
As mentioned earlier, mood and emotion differ on a few dimensions. Emotions tend to be 
stronger, more fleeting, and have a known source. Moods are not as strong, last longer, and do 
not have a known source. As a result of not having a clear source, mood may be more likely to 
be misattributed. The affect-as-information theory is not able to account for the ways that guilt 
acts as information for the self since it is a complex emotion that typically has a known source, 
rather than a commonly experienced mood such as sadness that typically has an unknown source.   
Affect Infusion Model. Another theory of mood and judgments is the affect infusion 
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model (AIM) (Forgas & George, 2001). While still unable to explain incongruent effects, this 
model identifies the conditions under which affect will or will not influence or shape cognition 
(affect infusion). Research has shown that affect can directly influence thinking (Clore & Byrne, 
1974).  The term affect infusion describes what happens when affectively charged information 
influences or becomes a part of a person’s judgments of cognitions related to an outcome. 
According to the AIM, the type of cognitive processing necessary for a judgment task moderates 
the relation between mood and judgment. Different contextual needs require different processing 
strategies.  
The four types of processing strategies the AIM identifies are direct access, motivated, 
heuristic, and substantive. Direct access refers to the direct retrieval of a preexisting response 
based on previous social situations. This strategy is likely to be used when constructive and 
extensive processing is not necessary, such as a familiar situation. Motivated processing is 
directed by a particular motivational objective; therefore, it involves a highly selective 
information search.  Heuristic processing should be used when there is no prior response to 
access and no direct motivation that guides a response. It is more open ended and constructive. 
The same is true for substantive processing, which refers to individuals interpreting new 
information and relating it to their preexisting memory-based structures in order to find the 
proper response.  
When using open-ended processing, such as heuristic or substantive processing, affect 
will influence judgments. These judgments can be generated either as a result of affect-priming 
mechanisms during substantive processing or as a result of affect-as-information mechanisms in 
the course of heuristic processing (Forgas, 2001).  When using direct access processing or 
motivated thinking, affect will not influence judgments. Motivated thinking can lead to specific 
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social goals that will limit the affect infusion.  
 Judgments about the self (versus others) may be more susceptible to affect effects 
according to the AIM. Self-referent information may be more complex and require more 
processing than other-referent information (Forgas et al., 1984). It has been shown that mood 
effects are greater for peripheral self-traits over central traits (Sedikides, 1995). Peripheral self-
descriptions are less salient and are held with less certainty and therefore require more 
constructive and substantive processing to be assembled. In contrast, central self-descriptions are 
held with high certainty so they are processed using direct access or heuristic strategies. 
Applying this theory to the context of this study, peripheral self-judgments seem likely to be 
affected by affect. It helps explain what sort of self-judgments may be influenced by feelings of 
guilt, and thus will guide my experiment design.    
 The AIM advances affect literature by describing the conditions under which affect will 
or will not influence or shape cognition. It falls short of providing a complete picture of the way 
affect influences cognitions because it only discusses times where the influence is congruent or 
there are not effects. It does not explain how affect influences cognitions in an incongruent way.  
Mood-as-Input 
The mood-as-input model is more comprehensive than the congruence approaches to 
affect. It is largely assumed that mood-congruent judgments are much more common than mood-
incongruent judgments (Martin, 2001). The congruence approaches assume that negative affect 
leads to more negative judgments and positive affect leads to more positive judgments. They 
assume that congruent judgments are the default and incongruent judgments are a very rare 
exception.  The mood-as-input model suggests that moods elicit different effects in different 
contexts and that there is no context-free default. A positive or negative mood can have positive 
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or negative implications. Context is configural and the meaning of a mood can change in 
different contexts. The mood-as-input model does not assume that the valence of a mood implies 
an inherent relationship between the mood and subsequent cognitions. According to the model, it 
is the implications of one’s mood, as well as the valence that influence one’s behavior. The same 
could be said about the implications and valence of emotions. Since emotions are stronger and 
have a known source they offer a better way to test the model. Both the affect-as-information 
model and the mood-as-input model assume that affect provides a person with information and 
then that information can influence that person’s motivations and evaluations (Schwarz & Clore, 
1988).  
Rather than simply asking, “How do I feel about it,” the mood-as-input model asserts that 
people ask themselves “What does it mean that I am feeling this way in this context?” Moods or 
emotions serve as input into a configural processing system. People take their positive mood 
along with other contextual information and make a judgment about a target. The mood is 
processed in parallel with the other information so that the mood in the context provides 
evaluative and motivational implications.  
One way to interpret whether or not a mood or emotion is desired in a certain context is if 
it fulfills a specific role. Higgins and Rholes (1976) discuss this role-fulfillment model as an 
approach to impression formation. A positive impression will be given if the target fulfills its 
role for what is expected. Negative evaluations happen when a target does not fulfill an expected 
role. A common example from the study is the target careful surgeon compared to casual 
surgeon (Higgins & Rholes, 1976). A surgeon is expected to be careful and by being described 
as careful the target, surgeon, is fulfilling that role. On the other hand, if the surgeon is described 
as casual the target is not meeting the expected role. Careful surgeon would receive a positive 
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evaluation and casual surgeon would receive a negative evaluation, even though careful, casual, 
and surgeon typically are all positive on their own.  
An important set of studies by Martin and colleagues (1997) demonstrated how the 
mood-as-input model relates to the role-fulfillment view of mood (Higgins & Rholes, 1976). 
Participants watched happy or sad video clips (to induce mood) and then read what they thought 
was a story another participant had written. They were told the writer was asked to write about 
an event that either made them happy or sad. They then rated how effective the story was in 
inducing its intended mood, how much they liked the story, and what grade they would give it. 
Participant’s evaluations of the story were more favorable when the participant’s mood 
suggested role fulfillment. When evaluating the happy story, happy participants judged the story 
to be more effective, reported liking it more, and gave it a higher grade than sad participants. 
When evaluating a sad story, sad participants judged the story to be more effective, reported 
liking it more, and gave it a higher grade than happy participants. Happy stories that left 
participants happy and sad stories that left participants sad were rated more favorably than happy 
stories that left participants sad and sad stories that left participants happy. This was evidence 
against the “How do I feel about it?” heuristic because those in happy moods did not give more 
favorable evaluations regardless of the story. When they read a sad story and felt sad, the 
negative mood can be interpreted as role fulfillment. This finding is an example of when a 
negative mood can lead to positive evaluations. This study focuses specifically on moods. The 
current study adds to the literature by testing this model with emotions.  
These findings were replicated in their second experiment by having participants watch a 
happy or sad video. Participants then immediately rated how much positive and negative 
adjectives reflected their current mood. After performing a filler task, participants read a happy 
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or sad story. They were then asked about the story, their current feelings, and completed an 
empathy measure. When reading the sad story, participants who had seen sad videos rated 
themselves much more favorably in terms of empathy than those who had seen positive videos. 
When evaluating the sad story, the sadder they felt after reading the story, the more positively 
they rated themselves on empathy. The research done by Martin and colleagues (1997) also 
shows that a participant’s negative feelings can suggest the presence of a more positive trait than 
positive feelings do. 
The mood-as-input model illustrates that negative moods can have positive implications 
in particular circumstances. The vast majority of theories of how affect influences judgments are 
congruency theories. The mood-as-input model suggests that in some situations affect may 
influence judgments in incongruent ways. Since guilt is an emotion rather than a mood, it may be 
a more stringent test of the mood-as-input theory. Emotions are harder to misattribute than 
moods. The mood-as-input model suggests that under certain circumstances, guilt may have 
positive implications, as individuals will use their feelings in a configural way as input to their 
self-judgments about particular traits.  
Emotion Regulation 
 If a negative emotion, such as guilt, can lead to positive evaluations, then there may be 
times when people may want to maintain negative feelings. When considering the valence of 
affect and emotion regulation, the hedonic approach is the dominant approach. The hedonic 
approach assumes people want to stay in positive moods and avoid negative moods. The hedonic 
approach has been more dominant in the literature and appears more intuitive. Assuming that 
people want to remain in a pleasant or positive state, people avoid things that make them feel bad 
and are drawn to things that make them feel good (Larsen, 2000). They want to increase pleasant 
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emotions and decrease unpleasant emotions. If they are angry at a sports game, they may turn the 
television off. If they are feeling stressed, they may go for a run. If people are driven solely by 
hedonic goals, how then are we able to explain why people would rate a sad movie more 
favorably than a happy movie? Or how can we explain why Titanic, a well-known tragedy, is 
still one of the highest grossing films of all time? A hedonic approach to emotions cannot answer 
these questions, but a functional or instrumental view (Frijda, 1986; Tamir, 2009) of emotions 
can. The functional view suggests the utility of the mood or emotion determines whether it is 
maintained or decreased.  
 In general, emotion regulation refers to individuals’ attempts to influence their emotions 
to attain some goal (Gross, 2002; Tamir 2011). The hedonic view focuses on the motivation to 
attain feeling pleasure. Increasing pleasant emotions and decreasing unpleasant emotions are 
valid motivations because individuals prefer pleasure to pain (Freud, 1926/1959). The main 
argument of the functional view is that individuals may also be motivated by instrumental goals 
(Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008). Determining how emotions are regulated may depend on the 
balance of hedonic and instrumental benefits of those emotions in a specific context (Tamir, 
2005; Tamir, Chiu, & Gross, 2007).   
An increasing number of recent studies support a functional view of emotion regulation 
that goes against the dominant hedonic approach. In general, people want to feel good over 
feeling bad. In the short term, however, people may be motivated to feel certain emotions for 
instrumental reasons that may or may not be hedonic (Tamir, 2009). They may be motivated to 
consider the utility, meaning usefulness in achieving a goal, of an emotion over simply feeling 
good. A study by Tamir and collegues (2007) examined the role of utility considerations in 
emotion regulation. First, participants demonstrated that they identified explicit and implicit 
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representations of emotional utility. They were asked to rate how much they agreed they should 
feel a certain emotion in order to optimize the pursuit of a certain goal. Explicitly, they reported 
they should feel an approach emotion when obtaining an approach goal, but not an avoidance 
goal. They also reported they should feel an avoidant emotion to reach an avoidance goal. 
Avoidant emotions are emotions such as worry, whereas an approach emotion they used was 
sadness.  For example, they reported they should feel excited in order to get a good grade on a 
paper. They also reported they should feel worry in order to avoid failures. In a lexical decision 
task showing implicit representations, participant’s scores favored approach emotions over 
avoidance emotions in the context of approach-related goals. In the context of avoidance related 
goals, participants favored avoidant emotions over approach emotions. The researchers also 
found that the more participants viewed unpleasant emotions as useful for avoiding an upcoming 
threat, the more likely they were to choose to experience them. These findings support the theory 
that utilitarian motives can take precedence over hedonic motives. People will endorse 
unpleasant or avoidant emotions if they are more appropriate for the context. 
 Tamir, Mitchell, and Gross (2008) conducted a study demonstrating that before engaging 
in confrontational tasks, individuals can be motivated to choose to engage in activities that are 
likely to increase anger over more pleasant options. Individuals were told they were either going 
to play a confrontational or non-confrontational game. Preferences for anger-inducing activities 
were higher than preferences for exciting or neutral activities when participants expected to play 
a confrontational game. Participants also showed improved performance on confrontational 
games after choosing to listen to anger-inducing music compared to excitement-inducing music. 
This shows that anger can be instrumental in certain contexts and it can be beneficial to maintain 
or elicit an angry feeling despite its unpleasant effects (Tamir et al., 2008). Similar to the 
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congruence theories, most of the work done using the instrumental view of emotions and moods 
focuses on moods rather than discrete emotions.  
The Present Research  
The current study examined how guilt and shame influence self-judgments. Guilt is a 
reparative-focused emotion that signals the individual cares that they hurt the person they have 
wronged (Baumeister et al., 1994). A guilty person feels bad, but it is the result of the bad thing 
they have done or the standard that they did not live up to. Feeling guilty may indicate that a 
person believes he or she is a better person than his or her behavior demonstrates. This could 
lead a person to want to stay feeling guilty in order to attain a social repair goal. While it is 
unpleasant, I expected that guilt would lead to positive self-enhancement on traits relating to 
desired interpersonal qualities and in scenarios where a participant wrote an apology letter. I 
predicted that shame would not lead to self-enhancement, because it is accompanied by painful 
feelings about the self and a sense of worthlessness (Tangney et al., 2007). 
Specifically, I expected that those in the guilt condition would rate themselves 
significantly higher on positive interpersonal traits compared to those in the shame and control 
condition. I also expected that those in the shame condition would show no difference in their 
ratings of interpersonal traits compared to the control condition. I predicted that before writing 
an apology letter, participants in the guilt condition would report wanting to stay in that affective 
state because it would be instrumental for them for the letter-writing task. I also predicted that 
after writing the letter, participants in the guilt condition would self-enhance when asked about 
the effectiveness of their letter compared to those in the shame and control conditions. As a 
secondary hypothesis, I predicted that the relation between the guilt condition and interpersonal 
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trait ratings would be moderated by guilt and shame proneness, religious commitment, and 
behavioral regulation tendencies.  
Hypothesis 1: I expected participants in the guilt condition would self-enhance more on 
interpersonal traits compared participants in the shame and control conditions.  
Hypothesis 2: I predicted that participants in the guilt condition would report a greater desire to 
stay in their current affective state before writing an apology compared to those in the shame or 
control conditions.  
Hypothesis 3: I predicted that participants in the guilt condition would self-enhance more on the 
effectiveness of their apology letter (i.e., evaluate their apology letter more highly) compared to 
those in the shame or control conditions. 
Method 
Design 
 Participants reported trait level guilt and shame, state guilt and shame, religious 
commitment, and behavioral regulation tendencies. Each participant was randomly assigned to 
an emotion induction condition (guilt, shame, or control). This was in the form of a visualization 
activity. All participants were instructed to visualize events from their daily lives. The first two 
events were the same across conditions. Those assigned to the guilt and shame conditions 
visualized events related to past moral transgressions. All participants were then asked to rate 
themselves on interpersonal and agentic traits. Self-ratings of interpersonal traits across 
conditions were used as a measure of self-enhancement. For the second part of the study, all 
participants were told to write letters to a person they imagined in the visualization activity. They 
then answered questions about how they planned to use their current affective state to help write 
the letter. After writing their letter they answered follow-up questions. These included a second 
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measure of self-enhancement. Participants were asked to rate how effective they thought their 
letter was at apologizing. Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their participation.   
Participants 
 Seventy-nine undergraduates from the introductory psychology courses at Virginia 
Commonwealth University (VCU) were recruited through an online sign-up system to participate. 
They were compensated with partial course credit. The only requirement for participation was 
that they were over 18 years old. Participants were 20.71 years of age on average (SD = 2.55). 
The sample was 57.5% female. Ethnicity to was varied (43.8% Caucasian, 28.8% African 
American, 11.3% Asian American, 7.5% Latino, Hispanic, 7% Other). 
Measures  
Trait Measures. I measured trait guilt and shame using the Guilt and Shame Proneness 
scale (GASP; Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011) in order to control for guilt and shame 
proneness and see if they act as moderators (see Hypothesis 4 below). I measured the tendency to 
use the Behavioral Activation System (BAS) and the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) (Carver 
& White, 1994). I looked at the BIS/BAS as a moderator (see Hypothesis 5 below). I measured 
religious commitment using the Religious Commitment Inventory-10 (Worthington, Wade, 
Hight, Ripley, McCullough, Berry, & O'Connor, L., 2003) to see if it acted as a moderator.  
Guilt and Shame Proneness. Arguably, the best way to assess trait guilt is through a 
scenario-based measure. The Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA, Tangney et al., 1989) is 
one of the most frequently used measures. The responses capture a number of behavioral, 
affective, and cognitive features related to guilt. A more recently developed scenario-based 
measure is the GASP (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011).   
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 Scenario-based measures have more advantages than measures such as global checklists. 
Many people have not spent time studying shame and guilt, or even emotions in general, so they 
may not know or be able to articulate how guilt and shame are different. By using scenarios, the 
measure is able to get around using the terms shame and guilt. It is more conceptually consistent 
with current notions of guilt. The GASP (α = .73) typically has higher internal consistency than 
the TOSCA-3 (α = .66). It is able to incorporate both the self-behavior and public private 
distinctions between guilt and shame. The GASP is also able to differentiate emotional and 
behavioral responses to transgressions (Cohen et al., 2011).  
 To measure guilt and shame proneness, participants completed the Guilt and Shame 
Proneness scale (GASP; Cohen et al., 2011), a 16-item measure that contains two 4-item guilt 
subscales and two 4-item shame subscales (refer to Appendix B for full scale). The guilt 
subscales differentiate between negative behavior-evaluations and repair action tendencies. The 
shame subscales differentiate between negative self-evaluations and withdrawal action 
tendencies. Participants were asked to imagine themselves in a situation and respond with the 
likelihood that they would respond in the way described (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely). An 
example of a negative behavior-evaluation item from the guilt subscale is, “After realizing you 
have received too much change at a store, you decide to keep it because the salesclerk doesn’t 
notice. What is the likelihood that you would feel uncomfortable about keeping the money?”  
 BIS/BAS. As previously discussed, the behavioral action system (BAS) controls 
movement towards a goal or behavior. The avoidance system, or the behavioral inhibition system 
(BIS), motivates inhibition of movements towards goals that may lead to negative outcomes 
(Gray, 1994). Participants completed a scale measuring the tendency to use the BAS and the BIS 
(Carver & White, 1994). The BAS subscale measures dispositional differences in approach 
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motivation and the BIS subscale measures dispositional differences in avoidance motivation. The 
scale consists of 24 items: 13 BAS, 7 BIS, and 4 filler items. Participants were asked to read 
each statement and report how much they agreed or disagreed with it on a 4-point scale (1 = very 
true for me, 4 = very false for me). An example of a BAS item is “When I want something I 
usually go all-out to get it.” An example of a BIS item is “Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a 
bit.” For the full scale refer to Appendix C.  
 Religious Commitment. To measure religious commitment participants completed the 
Religious Commitment Inventory – 10 (Worthington et al., 2003). For 10 items, participants 
were asked to indicate how much they agreed on a scale from 1 (not at all true of me) to 5 
(totally true of me) with a statement about being committed to their religion. An example item 
was “My religious beliefs lie behind my whole approach to life.” For the full scale refer to 
Appendix D. 
Emotion Induction. Affect has been successfully induced in the lab in a variety of ways. 
The difficulty of a successful induction depends on the desired mood or emotion. Clips of films 
such as Galipoli, Sophie’s Choice, Splash, Bullitt, and Stripes have been used to induce positive, 
negative, and neutral moods when demonstrating the mood-as-input model (Martin, Ward, 
Achee, & Wyer, 1993). When assessing emotional preferences, Tamir and Ford (2009) used 
different 30-second clips of music that induced excitement or fear. Preferences for watching 
particular movies that varied in emotional content have also been used as a measure to assess 
motives for emotion regulation (Tamir et al., 2007). Participants have also described the things 
that make them feel the most angry/sad/happy to specifically induce anger, sadness, and 
happiness (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Strack, Schwarz, & Gschneidinger, 1985). Like other self-
conscious emotions, guilt is a relatively complex emotion, so it is trickier to induce than a simple 
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positive or negative mood. For example, there is no musical selection that is able to universally 
instill feelings of guilt. Guilt involves specific self-standards and requires a level of self-
awareness; therefore what makes a person feel guilt is more complex (and perhaps more 
idiographic) than the tone of a musical piece.  
There are many ways that guilt can be induced and measured in the lab. Guilt is 
commonly induced through recalling events or imagined scenarios. Mancini, Gangemi, Perdighe, 
& Marini (2008) and Cougle, Goetz, Hawkins, and Fitch (2011) asked participants to recall a 
recent life event about which they felt guilty. Participants relived the event and wrote about it in 
as much detail as possible. In another study, participants imagined they were in their last year at 
university after taking longer than expected (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). They imagined they 
just failed an exam they did not study hard for that would let their parents down and cost them 
more tuition money. Other inductions have used procedures that make the participant believe 
they had hurt another participant in some way, such as making participants believe their failure at 
an unknowingly unsolvable game meant a confederate posing as another participant did not get 
extra points on an exam score (Darlington & Macker, 1966; Xu, Begue, & Bushman, 2012; 
Regan, Williams, & Sparling, 1972). Some have gone so far as to make participants feel guilty 
for ostensibly breaking a confederate’s camera (Regan et al., 1972).  
Using a contrived situation with a confederate or multiple participants may be more 
naturalistic, but it is harder to determine whether or not the situation will make all participants 
feel primarily guilt. Some people may respond with more feelings of shame or different feelings 
towards the person they have wronged. It is much harder for the manipulation to remain 
consistent and strong across participants and confederates. In addition, there are many potential 
confounds. In order to ensure that guilt is induced, the current study used a recall task with 
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specific prompts. This method has advantages over an imagined scenario because it likely will 
strengthen the reaction to the induction. Given that guilt and shame are self-conscious emotions, 
I expected the participants’ reactions would be stronger if they were based on their own past 
events. By providing prompts regarding their self-reported event, I was able to have some control 
over what participants thought about without losing the stronger emotions. 
Procedure 
 Participants came to a lab room located on the Monroe Park campus of Virginia 
Commonwealth University. They were seated in their own cubicle in order to avoid distractions 
from other participants. After they provided consent for participation, they were randomly 
assigned to the guilt, shame, or control condition. They first completed measures of guilt 
proneness, shame proneness, religious commitment, and a measure on the dispositional 
differences in the behavioral inhibition and behavioral action systems.  
Participants were told the researchers were interested in how people visualize events from 
their daily lives. All participants were told they would visualize different events they had 
experienced and answer some questions about them. Similar to past research, the first two events 
were intended to make the cover story stronger and participants were simply asked to visualize a 
recent bus ride and a local movie theatre (Martin et al. 1997). They then answered the following 
questions about the visualization:  
1. How vivid was your visualization?  
2. How clear was your visualization? 
3. How difficult was your visualization? 
4. How long ago did the event happen?  
 
Participants answered using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all vivid/clear/difficult, 7 = very 
vivid/clear/difficult) (See Appendix E for full scale).  
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Up until this point, the procedure was the same across participants. The third and final 
event was different based on random assignment of the guilt, shame, or control condition (See 
Appendix F). In order to induce guilt and shame, I modified prompts used to induced guilt and 
shame in past research (Manicini et al., 2008; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010; de Hooge, 
Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2011; Cougle et al., 2011): participants recalled a recent guilt-
related or shame-related life event. Participants recalled a recent interpersonal event that made 
them feel guilt or shame, or they recalled a typical weekday (control condition). Participants 
were told they had 10 minutes to continuously write as much as they could about the event. For 
the first five minutes, they were told to write about how they were feeling, and for the last five 
minutes they were instructed to write about why they were feeling that way.   
Guilt. The guilt induction read as follows: 
We all fall short of our moral standards at times. We would like you to think back on a 
time when you felt guilt after failing to act in a kind or moral way towards someone very 
close to you like a parent or friend, resulting in hurt and disappointment from your 
actions. What behavior did you fail to do that you knew you should have?  With this 
situation in mind, please try to vividly relive this event and describe it in as accurate 
and detailed way as possible (i.e., in all its details). What happened to make you feel 
guilty? What standard, value, or ideal didn’t you meet? What did you think or feel in the 
situation? How disappointed in your behavior were you? Include also such details as to 
what your sensations were on the occasion and how you feel about it now.  
Before you start writing, take a few moments to close your eyes and remember the event 
as clearly as possible. Remember that everything you write is completely confidential. 
You will have 10 minutes to write. Please write for the full 10 minutes. 
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For the first five minutes write about how you were feeling in this situation. How did 
you feel about failing to do the right thing? What was your general impression of the 
event? Do you remember feeling anything in particular while the event was happening or 
afterword? What sensations did you experience?  
For the second half of the visualization please write about why you were feeling that way. 
What explanation can you give for your experience? Was it common for you to feel this 
way? Why do you think you had these feelings? Write for the full five minutes including 
as much detail as possible.  
Shame. The shame induction was the same except the word guilt was replaced with 
shame and the event was framed in a way that is more in line with the behavioral inhibition 
system. That is, rather than participants writing about failing to live up to a moral standard, they 
were describing a time they did something that violated a moral standard. 
We all fall short of our moral standards at times. We would like you to think back on a 
time when you felt shame after disappointing or hurting someone very close to you like 
a parent or friend and it resulted in you feeling bad about yourself. What did you do that 
you should not have done? With this situation in mind, please try to vividly relive this 
event and describe it in as accurate and detailed way as possible (i.e., in all its details). 
What happened to make you feel ashamed? What did you do that you knew was wrong? 
What did you think or feel in the situation? How disappointed in yourself were you? 
Include also such details as to what your sensations were on the occasion and how you 
feel about it now.  
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Before you start writing, take a few moments to close your eyes and remember the event 
as clearly as possible. Remember that everything you write is completely confidential. 
You will have 10 minutes to write. Please write for the full 10 minutes. 
For the first five minutes write about how you were feeling in this situation. How did 
you feel about the doing this bad thing? What was your general impression of the event? 
Do you remember feeling anything in particular while the event was happening or 
afterword? What sensations did you experience?  
For the second half of the visualization please write about why you were feeling that way. 
What explanation can you give for your experience? Was it common for you to feel this 
way? Why do you think you felt so bad about yourself? Write for the full five minutes 
including as much detail as possible.  
  Control. For the control group, participants described a typical weekday.  
We would like you to think back to a day that you would describe as a typical weekday. 
With this situation in mind, please try to vividly relive this event and describe it in as 
accurate and detailed way as possible (i.e., in all its details). What happened on this 
typical day? What did you think or feel in the situation? Include also such details as to 
what your sensations were on the occasion and how you feel about it now.  
Before you start writing, take a few moments to close your eyes and remember the event 
as clearly as possible. Remember that everything you write is completely confidential. 
For the first five minutes write about how you were feeling in this situation. How did 
you feel on this typical weekday? What was your general impression of the event? Do 
you remember feeling anything in particular while the event was happening or afterword? 
What sensations did you experience?  
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For the second half of the visualization please write about why you were feeling that way. 
What explanation can you give for your experience? Was it common for you to feel this 
way? Why do you think you had these feelings? Write for the full five minutes including 
as much detail as possible.  
After the 10 minutes was over, participants answered the following questions. Responses 
were indicated on 7-point likert scales (For full scale see Appendix F). The last three questions 
served as manipulation checks regarding their effort in visualizing the event and whether they 
were able to recall an appropriate recent event.  
1. How vivid was your visualization?  
2. How clear was your visualization? 
3. How difficult was your visualization? 
4. How easy was it for you to think of a recent situation as we asked? 
5. How much effort did you put into visualizing this situation?  
6. Were you honest about what you wrote down?  
7. How long ago did the event happen? 
 
For the guilt and shame conditions, I asked how severe the victim thought the offense was in 
order to look closer at the event severity.    
Affect manipulation check. As a manipulation check, all participants completed the State 
Shame and Guilt Scale (Marschall, Sanftner, & Tangney, 1994). This consists of 15 items 
assessing in-the-moment feelings of shame, guilt, and pride (five items per subscale) (See 
Appendix A). I did not assess their ratings of pride since it is not in the interest of the current 
study. That brought the total number of items to 10.  Past research has shown high inter-item 
reliability for each subscale (shame: α = .89, guilt: α = .82). Respondents answered how they 
were feeling right at that moment (1 = not feeling this way at all, 5 = feeling this way very 
strongly), such that higher numbers reflected greater guilt and shame. An example guilt item is “I 
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feel like apologizing, confessing.” An example item of shame is “I want to sink into the floor and 
disappear.”  
 They then rated themselves on interpersonal traits and agentic traits on an 11-point scale 
(1 = describes me not at all, 11 = describes me very much). Some examples of interpersonal 
traits are kindhearted, moral, and nurturing. Some examples of agentic traits are ambitious, 
confident, and dominant (refer to Appendix G). 
 Emotion Regulation.  After rating themselves on interpersonal and agentic traits, 
participants completed another writing task. Participants were told that they would write a letter 
of apology to the person who was the victim in their visualization. Participants in the guilt and 
shame condition were told they would then write a letter of apology regarding the offense they 
just visualized. They were asked to write about what they thought or felt during their 
visualization and apologize for either what standard they did not live up to or what they did 
wrong. Participants in the control condition were told to write a letter to someone close to them 
about their typical weekday that they visualized. They were instructed to write for five minutes.  
Before writing the letter, participants indicated the extent to which they wanted to stay in 
their current affective state or escape from it (see Appendix I). Participants were asked how they 
planned to prepare themselves to be able to complete the task (i.e., write the letter). They 
responded to three questions and rated how much they planned on utilizing certain strategies (1 = 
not at all, 7 = very much). They then answered the following questions: 
1. To what extent do you plan to re-experience the offense while writing the letter? 
2. How hard will you try to keep feeling the same way you are feeling right now while 
writing the letter? 
3. How much do you want to stay in the same emotional state you are in as the result of 
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your visualization?  
After writing the letter, as a second measure of self-enhancement, participants rated how 
well they thought they wrote their letter. They were asked to rate how effective they thought 
their letter was in communicating their apology, how well the victim would response to the letter 
if he or she were to read it, and how sincere they think the letter sounds (see Appendix I).  
Results 
Dependent and Moderating Variables 
The dependent variables I looked at were self-ratings of interpersonal and agentic traits, 
desire to maintain current feelings in order to write a letter, and perceived effectiveness of an 
apology letter. The moderators I planned to look at were guilt and shame proneness, religious 
commitment, and tendency to use the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) or behavioral action 
system (BAS). The means for all the variables separated by condition are presented in Table 1 
and Table 2.  
The State Guilt and Shame scale items were all scored in a positive direction. I created 
the shame (α = .86) and guilt (α = .83) subscales by averaging five items for each emotion. To 
assess self-ratings on interpersonal and agentic traits, I averaged ratings on the 10 interpersonal 
traits (α = .91) and on the 10 agentic traits (α = .87). The desire to maintain current affective state 
and effectiveness of letter were both assessed using three items. Both were positively scored and 
the averages of the three items were used. The items assessing effectiveness of letter showed 
inter-item reliability (α = .75), but the items assessing a desire to maintain current feelings were 
not reliable (α = .46).  
 
 
 34 
Table 1 
 
Mean Scores for State Feelings and Dependent Variables Separated by Condition 
 
 
   Shame               Guilt           Agentic        Interpersonal     Maintain       Effective    
  
 
Control 1.61 (.93)   1.72 (.90)     8.03 (1.36)       8.58(1.51)       5.15(1.17)    5.60 (.85) 
Guilt           1.78 (.81)   2.23 (1.03)   8.18(1.66)        9.29(1.03)       4.67(1.18)    5.35(1.35) 
Shame         1.85 (.91)   2.50 (1.20)     7.86 (1.78)      8.91 (1.71)     4.65(1.12)    5.52 (1.23) 
 
 
 
Note. Shame and Guilt were measured on a 5-point scale (1 = not feeling this way at all, 5 = 
feeling this way very strongly). Self-evaluations of traits were measured on an 11-point scale (1 = 
describes me not at all, 11 = describes me very much). Desire to maintain current affective state 
and effectiveness of letter were measures on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).  
 
As recommended by the scale authors, I created subscales for the GASP and BIS/BAS 
and planned to put the subscales into the models separately. Averaging the four items in each 
subscale created the four GASP subscales (Guilt- Negative Behavior Evaluation, α = .70; Guilt- 
Repair, α = .69; Shame – Negative Self-Evaluation, α = .68; Shame-Withdraw, α = .44). All 
items were scored in the positive direction. I created the BAS-Drive subscale by averaging four 
reverse-scored items (α = .74). I created the BAS-Fun Seeking subscale by averaging four 
reverse-scored items (α = .55). I created the BAS-Reward Responsiveness subscale by averaging 
five reverse-scored items (α = .70). I created the BIS subscale by averaging five reverse-scored 
items and two positively-scored items (α = .81). To assess religious commitment, I averaged all 
10 items on the inventory (α = .95). All items were scored in a positive direction.  
The BAS fun-seeking subscale and the GASP – Shame/Withdrawal subscale had inter-
item reliability under .60 and were not included in analyses.  
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Table 2 
 
Mean Scores for Moderating Variables Separated by Condition 
 
 
  GASP-NBE      GASP-REPAIR        GASP-NSE        BIS     BAS-Drive   BAS-Reward 
 
Control      4.96 (1.23)   5.42 (1.12)         5.10(1.37)      2.97 (.60)      3.07(.54)       3.56(.40) 
Guilt          4.97 (1.59)   5.59 (.96)           5.23(1.20)      2.97 (.57)      2.90(.59)       3.52(.39) 
Shame        5.26 (1.11)   5.81 (.73)           5.28(1.06)      2.81 (.56)      2.92(.49)       3.64(.32) 
 
Note. The GASP was measured on a 7-point scale (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely). The 
BIS/BAS was measured on a 4-point scale (1 = very true for me, 4 = very false for me).  
 
Manipulation check. 
 To determine whether the emotion induction was effective, the differences in state shame 
and guilt were assessed. To test whether the shame condition significantly increased shame over 
the guilt and control conditions, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated to 
determine the effect of condition on state shame. The overall model was not significant, F (2, 77) 
= .52, p = .60. This means that there was no significant difference in state feelings of shame for 
the control (M = 1.61, SD = .93), guilt (M = 1.78, SD = .81), and shame (M = 1.85, SD = .91) 
conditions. To further examine the differences between groups, Tukey HSD post-hoc 
comparisons were calculated. They revealed no significant differences in shame between the 
shame and guilt groups, p = .94, shame and the control groups, p = .54, and guilt and the control 
groups, p =.73. I ran a planned contrast comparing the combined feelings of shame for a 
combined shame and guilt group to the control condition. There was no significant difference 
between the feelings of shame for the control group and the combined shame and guilt group, 
t(77) = -1.07, p = .29. Thus, it appears that the manipulation was largely unsuccessful.  
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To check that the guilt condition significantly increased guilt compared to the shame and 
control conditions, a separate one-way ANOVA was calculated to determine the effect of 
condition on state guilt. The overall model was significant, F (2, 77) = 3.80, p = .03. This means 
that the average state feeling of guilt was significantly different when comparing the means of 
the control (M = 1.72, SD = .90), guilt (M = 2.23, SD = 1.03), and shame (M = 2.50, SD = 1.20) 
conditions. To determine which groups significantly differed, a planned contrast was calculated 
based on a priori hypothesis that state guilt for the guilt group would be higher compared to other 
conditions. A contrast between guilt and all other groups indicated that there was a not 
significant difference between the weighted mean of guilt and the combined weighted mean of 
all other groups, t (77) = .49, p = .63. 
To determine where the difference was, Tukey HSD post hoc tests were included in the 
ANOVA. These contrasts revealed that there was a significant difference between the mean of 
the shame group compared to the control, p = .02. The contrasts between the shame group and 
guilt group and the guilt group and the control group were not significant.  This means that 
across conditions there was a difference in the state feelings of guilt. The post hoc test shows that 
those in the shame condition reported feeling the highest amount of guilt across conditions.  
A planned contrast was calculated to determine if the weighted mean of state guilt for 
those in the combined guilt and shame group was higher compared to the control condition. The 
result of this contrast shows that the combined shame and guilt groups reported significantly 
more guilt compared to the control group, t(77) = -2.62, p = .01.  
Hypothesis 1: I expected participants in the guilt condition would self-enhance more on 
interpersonal traits compared to participants in the shame and control conditions.  
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To test the effect of condition and sex on self-ratings for interpersonal and agentic traits a 
3 (emotion condition: guilt, shame, control) X 2 (sex: male, female) X 2(trait type: interpersonal, 
agentic; within) mixed ANOVA was calculated. Participants were divided into the groups based 
on the condition they were randomly assigned to (shame, guilt, control) and self identification as 
either male or female. Results indicated a significant main effect of trait type, F (1, 73) = 24.91, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .22. There was also a significant interaction between sex and trait type, F (1, 
73) = 10.11, p < .01, partial η2 = .09. Although both men and women rated themselves higher on 
interpersonal traits (M = 8.93, SD = .16) compared to agentic traits (M = 8.03, SD = .18) across 
conditions, the effect is more pronounced in women (M = 9.32, SD = 1.41) compared to men (M 
= 8.55, SD = 1.61). Women reported significantly higher ratings on interpersonal traits compared 
to men, t(77) = 2.44, p = .02. The main effects of emotion condition and sex were not significant. 
The interaction between trait type and condition was not significant. The three-way interaction 
involving trait type, condition, and sex also was not significant. This means that participants 
were reporting higher self-evaluations on interpersonal traits compared to agentic traits. This was 
consistent across conditions and this effect was even more pronounced for females. Even though 
the crucial interaction was not significant, I proceeded to analyze the interpersonal traits in order 
to fully test Hypothesis 1. 
 A one-way between-groups ANOVA was calculated to explore the impact of emotion 
condition on the endorsement of interpersonal traits. The overall model was not significant, F (2, 
77) = 1.68, p = .19. This means that there was no significant difference on self-evaluations for 
interpersonal traits across the control (M = 8.58, SD = 1.51), guilt (M = 9.29, SD = 1.03, and 
shame conditions (M = 8.91, SD = 1.71). Those in the guilt condition did not report significantly 
higher ratings on interpersonal traits, and post-hoc comparisons did not reveal any significant 
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differences in the means among any of the conditions. As a result of the average feelings of guilt 
and shame not being significant for the guilt and shame group, I conducted an independent 
samples t-test to determine whether the control group compared to the shame and guilt group 
combined showed differences in ratings on interpersonal traits. The test revealed there was no 
significant difference between the control group and the combined shame and guilt group, t(78) 
= -1.60, p = .11. Although the model was not significant, it was important to determine if 
participants were self-enhancing on either types of traits and to see if their trait ratings differed 
across conditions. As a result of the relation between guilt and interpersonal traits being 
nonsignificant, I did not include the moderating variables in any models.  
Hypothesis 2: I predicted that, before writing an apology letter, participants in the guilt 
condition would report a greater desire to stay in their current affective state and use their 
feelings to help them write and apology letter compared to those in the shame or control 
conditions.  
Although the items used to assess a desire to maintain current feelings were not reliable 
(α = .46) I proceeded with the analysis, as it was one of my main hypotheses. A one-way 
between-groups ANOVA was run to explore the impact of condition on the desire to remain in a 
current affective state and specifically to test the hypothesis that there would be a statistically 
significant difference in the level of desire to maintain a current affective state for the three 
groups (guilt, shame, control).  The overall model was not significant, F (2, 77) = 1.66, p = .20. 
This means that the average desire to maintain current feelings was not significantly different 
across the control (M = 15.46, SD = 3.50), guilt (M = 14.00, SD = 3.55), and shame (M = 13.96, 
SD = 3.36) conditions. Tukey HSD post-hoc comparisons were calculated in order to further 
investigate differences among groups. They revealed no significant differences in desire to 
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maintain affect between the shame and guilt groups, p = .99, shame and the control groups, p 
= .26, and guilt and the control groups, p = .27. 
In order to be consistent across hypotheses, I conducted an independent samples t-test to 
determine whether the control group compared to the shame and guilt group combined showed 
differences in ratings on desire to maintain affect. The test revealed there was no significant 
difference between the control group and the combined shame and guilt group, t(78) = .1.83, p 
= .07. 
Hypothesis 3: I predicted that participants in the guilt condition would self-enhance more on the 
effectiveness of their letter compared to those in the shame or control conditions. 
A one-way between-groups ANOVA was run to explore the impact of condition on the 
endorsement of the effectiveness of their letter and specifically to test the hypothesis that there 
would be a statistically significant difference in the level of effectiveness ratings for the three 
groups (guilt, shame, control).  The overall model was not significant, F (2, 77) = .33, p = .72. 
This means that there were no significant differences in reported effectiveness of the letter 
participants wrote across the control (M = 5.60, SD = .84), guilt (M = 5.35, SD = 1.35), and 
shame (M = 5.52, SD = 1.14) conditions. Tukey HSD post-hoc comparisons were calculated and 
revealed no significant differences in effectiveness of the letter between the shame and guilt 
groups, p = .85, shame and the control groups, p = .97, and guilt and the control groups, p = .70. 
An independent samples t-test also revealed no significant difference on effectiveness of letter 
between the control group and the combined shame and guilt group, t(78) = .69, p = .54 
Controlling for Overlap in Shame and Guilt 
 In order to control for the overlap in shame and guilt, I included both state shame and 
guilt in a multiple regression and looked at the unique variance each one accounted for in 
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predicting each of the dependent variables. I analyzed these separately for the guilt and the 
shame condition. 
Table 3 
 
Correlations with Shame and Guilt Separated by Condition  
 
            Shame             Guilt               Control 
 
                  
  Shame             Shame             Shame 
Guilt             .80***             .58**                .62*** 
                             
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
 A standard multiple regression analysis was conducted for the guilt and shame condition 
to examine whether guilt and shame predicted ratings on interpersonal traits. Guilt and shame 
were simultaneously entered into the models. The overall model for the guilt condition did not 
significantly predict ratings on interpersonal traits, F(2, 24) = .34, p = .75, R2 = .02. Together, 
these predictors only accounted for 2.4% of the variance ratings of interpersonal traits. The 
overall model for the shame condition significantly predicted ratings on interpersonal traits, F(2, 
22) = 3.71, p = .04, R2 = .25. Together, these predictors accounted for 25.2% of the variance 
ratings of interpersonal traits. Shame was a significant predictor of interpersonal trait ratings, 
t(22) = -2.18, p =.04, β = -.68. This indicates that as shame increased by one standard deviation 
(SD = .19), interpersonal trait ratings decreased by -.68 standard deviations. Guilt was not a 
significant predictor, t(24) = .79, p = .44. This means that feeling more shame predicted lower 
self-ratings on interpersonal traits, but feelings of guilt did not predict self-ratings on 
interpersonal traits for those in the shame condition.  
 A standard multiple regression analysis was conducted for the guilt and shame condition 
to examine whether guilt and shame predicted ratings on agentic traits. Guilt and shame were 
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simultaneously entered into both models. The overall model did not significantly predict ratings 
on agentic traits for those in the guilt condition, F(2, 24) = .70, p = .50, R2 = .06. Together, these 
predictors only accounted for 5.5% of the variance ratings of agentic traits. The overall model for 
the shame condition significantly predicted ratings on agentic traits, F(2, 22) = 7.13, p < .01, R2 
= .39. Together these predictors accounted for 39.3% of the variance ratings of agentic traits. 
Shame was a significant predictor of agentic trait ratings, t(22) = -2.79, p =.01, β = -.78. This 
indicates that as shame increased by one standard deviation (SD = .19), agentic trait ratings 
decreased by -.78 standard deviations. Guilt was not a significant predictor, t(24) = .73, p = .47. 
This means that greater feelings of shame predicted lower ratings of agentic traits, but feelings of 
guilt did not predict ratings on agentic traits for those in the shame condition.  
 A standard multiple regression analysis was conducted for the guilt and shame condition 
to examine whether guilt and shame predicted ratings on desire to maintain affect. Guilt and 
shame were simultaneously entered into the model. The overall model did not significantly 
predict ratings on desire to maintain affect for those in the guilt condition, F(2, 24) = .66, p = .53, 
R2 = 05. Together, these predictors only accounted for 5.2% of the variance ratings on desire to 
maintain affect. The overall model for the shame condition significantly predicted ratings on 
desire to maintain affect, F(2, 22) = 8.11, p < .01, R2 = .43. Together these predictors accounted 
for 42.5% of the variance ratings on desire to maintain affect. However, on their own, shame was 
not a significant predictor of desire to maintain affect, t(22) = -.56, p =.58, β = -.15,  nor was 
guilt a significant predictor though the effect was marginal, t(24) = -1.92, p = .07, β = -.52. This 
means that greater feelings of guilt and shame combined, but not individually, predicted a lower 
desire to maintain current feelings for those in the shame condition.  
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 A standard multiple regression analysis was conducted for the guilt and shame condition 
to examine whether guilt and shame predicted ratings on effectiveness of the letter participants 
wrote. Guilt and shame were simultaneously entered into the model. The overall model did not 
significantly predict ratings on effectiveness of letter for those in the guilt condition, F(2, 24) = 
1.94, p = .17, R2 = .14. Together, these predictors only accounted for 13.9% of the variance 
ratings of effectiveness of letter. The overall model for the shame condition did not significantly 
predict ratings of effectiveness of letter, F(2, 22) = 1.95, p = .17, R2 = .15. Together these 
predictors only accounted for 15.1% of the variance of ratings of effectiveness of letter.  
Correlations of Guilt and Shame with Dependent Variables  
 Correlational analyses were performed to determine the relation between feelings of guilt 
and shame and self-ratings of interpersonal and agentic traits, effectiveness of letter, and emotion 
regulation (desire to maintain current feelings) (see Tables 4, 5, & 6). Results were separated by 
condition. There was a significant negative relation with interpersonal traits and feelings of 
shame for the control condition, r(26) = -.53, p < .01, and the shame condition, r(23) = -.45, p 
= .03. There was no significant relation for those in the guilt condition. This means that higher 
feelings of shame were related to lower self-evaluations of interpersonal traits when people 
recalled a time they hurt someone close to them and in general. This is similar to my hypothesis. 
When people are feeling more shame, they are more distressed and think of themselves as being 
a bad person. They focus on the thing they should not have done, rather than trying to repair their 
relationship with the person they hurt. This could be what is causing them to report lower self-
evaluations on interpersonal traits.   
There was a significant negative relation between state guilt and ratings of interpersonal 
traits for the control condition r(26) = -.55, p < .01. There was no significant relation for the guilt 
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and shame conditions. This means that lower feelings of guilt were related to higher ratings of 
interpersonal traits, but they were not significantly related in the shame or guilt conditions. There 
was a significant negative relation with feelings of shame and ratings on agentic traits for the 
control condition, r(26) = -.52, p < .01, and the shame condition, r(23) = -.57, p < .01. This 
means that higher feelings of shame were associated with lower ratings on agentic traits for those 
in the shame induction and in general.  
There was a significant negative relation with feelings of shame and desire to maintain 
current feelings for those in the shame condition, r(23) = -.57, p < .01. There was also a 
significant negative relation with feelings of guilt and desire to maintain current feelings for 
those in the shame condition, r(23) = -.67, p < .01.  This means that for those in the shame 
condition, higher feelings of guilt and shame were associated with a lower desire to maintain 
current feelings. There was a significant positive relation with ratings of agentic traits and 
effectiveness of letter for the guilt condition, r(25) = .54, p < .01, and the control condition, r(26) 
= .55, p < .01. There was also a significant positive relation with ratings of interpersonal traits 
and effectiveness of letter for the guilt condition, r(25) = .55, p < .001. This means that for those 
in the guilt induction, higher ratings of effectiveness of the letter they wrote were associated with 
higher rating of agentic and interpersonal traits. Higher ratings of agentic traits were also related 
to greater ratings of effectiveness of their letter for those in the control condition. There was a 
positive relation with ratings on interpersonal traits and desire to maintain feelings for those in 
the shame condition, r(23) = .43, p = .03, along with a positive relation between desire to 
maintain and ratings of effectiveness, r(23) = .45, p = .03. This means that for those in the shame 
condition, higher ratings on interpersonal traits were associated with a greater desire to maintain 
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their current affective state. Greater desire to maintain their affective state was also related to 
higher ratings of effectiveness of their apology letter. 
Table 4 
 
Correlations among Dependent Variables for Guilt Condition  
 
 
 Shame       Guilt       Agentic    Interpersonal  Maintain    Effective  
Shame -- .58** -.17 .03 -.19    -.32  
Guilt  -- -.08 .05 .07    -.21   
Agentic   - .30 .10    .54**  
Intpersonal    - .06    .55**  
Maintain     -    .29  
Effective         --  
       
 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
Table 5 
 
Correlations among Dependent Variables for Shame Condition  
 
 
 Shame       Guilt       Agentic    Interpersonal  Maintain    Effective  
Shame -- .81** -.57** -.45* -.57**    -.33  
Guilt  -- -.42* -.30 -.67**    -.09   
Agentic   - .65** .38    .20  
Interpersonal    - .43*    .27  
Maintain     -    .45*  
Effective         --  
       
 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
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Table 6 
 
Correlations among Dependent Variables for Control Condition  
 
 
 Shame       Guilt       Agentic    Interpersonal  Maintain    Effective  
Shame -- .63** -.52** -.53** -.30    -.15  
Guilt  -- -.20 .55** -.01    .09   
Agentic   - .36 .48*    .55**  
Interpersonal    - .21    .37  
Maintain     -    .29  
Effective         --  
       
 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
Correlations of Moderating Variables with Dependent Variables 
 The correlations of moderating variables with dependent variables can be found in Tables 
7, 8, and 9. There was a positive relation between agentic traits and BAS – drive for the guilt, 
r(25) = .64, p < .001, and shame condition, r(23) = .49, p < .01. There was no significant relation 
for the control condition. A possible explanation for the presence of correlations in the emotion 
induction conditions and not in the control condition is clearer after examining the items in the 
BAS – drive subscale. An example item is “When I want something I usually go all-out to get it.” 
This is similar to the agentic traits such as go-getter, confident, and ambitious. It is interesting 
that there was no correlation in the control condition. This could be due to the approach-
orientation that is associated with feelings of guilt.  
There was a significant positive relation with interpersonal traits and GASP – NBE 
scores for the guilt, r(25) = .53, p < .01, and control conditions, r(26) = .50, p < .01. There was 
no significant relation for the shame condition. There was also a significant positive relation with 
GASP – NSE scores and interpersonal traits for the guilt, r(25) = .47, p = .03, and control 
conditions, r(26) = .57, p < .01. This means that higher scores on guilt and shame proneness 
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were related to higher ratings on interpersonal traits for those in the guilt condition and control 
condition. Specifically, guilt proneness associated with negative behavior evaluations and shame 
proneness related to negative self evaluations. There was a significant positive relation between 
interpersonal traits and GASP-Repair for the control condition, r(27) = .54, p < .01. This means 
that higher scores on guilt proneness associated with a repair focus were related to higher ratings 
on interpersonal traits when there was no emotion induction.  
There was a significant positive correlation among the BIS and agentic trait ratings in the 
shame, r(24) = -.67, p < .01, and control, r(26) = -.39, p = .04, conditions. This means a greater 
tendency to activate an inhibitory self-regulation system was associated with lower ratings on 
agentic traits for those in the shame induction and control group. The only variable significantly 
related to religious commitment was state shame in the shame condition. There was a significant 
negative relation with religious commitment and state shame in the shame condition, r(24) = -.62, 
p <.01. This means those who reported greater religious commitment reported lower feelings of 
state shame.  
Table 7 
 
Correlations among Potential Moderators and Dependent Variables for Guilt Condition  
 
 
                       Agentic      Interpersonal    
Agentic   --  
Interpersonal  .30 --    
GASPNBE  .07 .53**    
GASPrepair  .01 .29      
GASPNSE -.18 .47*       
BASDrive          .64**          .11 
BASReward       .30             .26 
BIS -.24 .24     
 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
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Table 8 
 
Correlations among Potential Moderators and Dependent Variables for Shame Condition 
  
 
                       Agentic      Interpersonal    
Agentic   --  
Interpersonal  .65** --    
GASPNBE  -.02 .22    
GASPrepair  -.03 .22      
GASPNSE -.28 -.13       
BASDrive          .49*              .38 
BASReward       .11              .11 
BIS -.67** -.48*     
 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
Table 9 
 
Correlations among Potential Moderators and Dependent Variables for Control Condition  
 
 
                       Agentic      Interpersonal    
Agentic   --  
Interpersonal  .36 --    
GASPNBE  .02 .50**    
GASPrepair  .09 .54**      
GASPNSE -.13 .57**       
BASDrive          .37             -.04 
BASReward       .35             .12 
BIS -.39* .31     
 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
Discussion 
 Affect has important implications for daily life. Not only does it make people feel a 
certain way, it also has the power to change a person’s cognitions. Previous research has focused 
on congruence models of affect (Affect-as-Information, Schwarz & Clore, 1983; AIM, Forgas & 
George, 2001). Most theories of affect only account for times when the valence of the mood or 
emotion matches the valence of a subsequent judgment. Recent research has shown that is not 
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always the case (Martin et al., 1997). Mood or emotion can be used as information in a 
configural evaluative process. The current study aimed to further the literature on how affect 
influences judgments. The influence of affect on self-judgments has been understudied and 
previous research has failed to look at the ways guilt and shame may affect judgments. By 
studying the effects guilt and shame have on self-judgments, the field benefits from a better 
understanding of how moral emotions can influence the self.  
Before now, no other study has considered the potential intrapersonal benefits of feeling 
guilt. Guilt and shame both arise after moral transgressions. Guilt and shame have shown 
conceptual overlap in the past, but they are distinctive emotions (Tangney et al., 2007). Guilt is 
typically associated with a negative evaluation of a behavior after a transgression. Shame is 
associated with a negative evaluation of the global self after a transgression. People feeling guilt 
have been found to be approach oriented. Guilt can have many interpersonal benefits because it 
is a signal that you want to repair an important relationship (Baumeister et al., 1994). Based on 
the different influences guilt and shame have on the self, previous research suggested that when 
people feel guilt they might think of themselves as possessing higher levels of interpersonal traits. 
As a result of the maladaptive nature of shame, previous research suggested that when people felt 
shame they would not identify as strongly with certain interpersonal traits.  
Previous research has also shown that in certain contexts people use emotions in an 
instrumental way (Tamir, 2009). This means they may regulate their emotions in order to help 
achieve a goal. Most of the theories of emotion regulation suggest that people are driven by 
hedonic motives. Recent work has shown that people may choose to maintain negative emotions, 
such as anger, in order to achieve a goal. Guilt is a negative emotion, but it is also a repair-
focused emotion. Previous research suggested that in certain contexts guilt might be maintained 
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in order to help repair an interpersonal relationship. No previous research had looked at guilt in 
this way.  
I hypothesized that when feeling guilt, participants would rate themselves higher on 
interpersonal traits compared to those feeling shame or those who received no emotion induction. 
I also hypothesized that those feeling guilt would express a desire to maintain their feelings of 
guilt in order to help them write an apology letter. Additionally, I hypothesized that those feeling 
guilt would also self-enhance on how effective they thought their letter was compared to those in 
the shame or control condition. My hypotheses were not supported by the data. A main reason 
for the failure of present findings to support my hypotheses is that my guilt and shame 
manipulations did not work as I had planned. Those in both the shame and guilt condition 
reported feeling more guilt than shame. Those in the shame condition reported feeling the most 
guilt and there were no significant differences in feelings of shame across conditions. After 
conducting follow-up analyses, feelings of shame did not differ across any of the groups. By 
looking at the differences in feelings of guilt for the control condition compared to a combined 
guilt and shame group, I found that the combined guilt/shame group felt more guilt compared to 
the control group.  
Past work suggested that there would be significant differences when guilt was framed as 
failing to do a good thing and when shame would be framed as doing a bad thing (Sheikh & 
Janoff-Bulman, 2010), but that was not supported by the present research. The current study 
combined this type of framing with writing prompts used in previous studies. As a result of using 
new writing prompts that tried to induce shame and guilt, the effects produced in previous work 
may have been diminished. Another possible reason for this could be the way that certain words 
were emphasized in the manipulation prompts. There was a great deal of text for participants to 
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read, so it is possible that when rereading the instructions, the individuals in the shame condition 
were focusing on thinking of their bad behavior rather than being a bad person as a result of their 
behavior.  
Although none of my main hypotheses were supported, I was able to control for the 
conceptual overlap in shame and guilt by looking at whether or not they individually predicted 
ratings on interpersonal traits, agentic traits, desire to maintain affect, or effectiveness of the 
letter for the guilt and shame conditions. For the shame condition, greater shame predicted lower 
interpersonal and agentic traits ratings. Guilt was not a predictor of either. Although I was 
focusing on how feelings of guilt related to self-evaluations, it is consistent with past work that 
feelings of shame are related to negative self-evaluations. Together, feelings of guilt and shame 
predicted a lower desire to maintain current feelings for those in the shame condition. Neither 
guilt nor shame was a significant predictor of effectiveness of letter in either the guilt or shame 
conditions.  
These findings are consistent with the theories accounting for how affect influences 
judgment and how affect regulation is driven by hedonic motives. Greater feelings of shame led 
to negative self-evaluations. Shame is a painful negative emotion that has been shown to be 
maladaptive. My findings suggest negative feelings of shame are being used as information for 
subsequent judgments on ratings of self-traits, which is consistent with the Affect-as-Information 
theory (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). The Mood-as-Input model (Martin et al., 1997) can also 
account for this finding. The negative feelings of shame are being considered in combination 
with the painful event the participant described. Configural processing of feelings of shame 
would also lead to negative self-evaluations. My finding that feelings of guilt and shame 
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predicted a lower desire to maintain affect is consistent with the hedonic approach to emotion 
regulation. Participants expressed a desire to reduce their negative emotions.  
I was also able to examine some preliminary analyses that yielded interesting findings. 
Lower feelings of guilt were related to higher ratings of interpersonal traits in the control 
condition, but they were not significantly related in the shame or guilt conditions. This is 
interesting because it goes against what I hypothesized. In general, when people reported lower 
feelings of guilt there was as association with higher interpersonal ratings. Future research could 
look at why inducing guilt reduces this association.  A close examination of the events 
participants wrote about could also lead to a greater understanding of how recalling and writing 
about past transgressions is influencing the relation between guilt and ratings of interpersonal 
traits. The content of their written descriptions of the events could provide insight for future 
research.   
For those in the shame condition, higher feelings of guilt and shame were associated with 
a lower desire to maintain current feelings. This also goes against my hypothesis. Even though 
those in the shame condition felt the most guilt, perhaps the past events they imagined were more 
negative and that is why they wished to reduce their negative affect even if they were writing an 
apology letter. Future research and follow-up analyses could be done to assess the qualitative 
differences in the events described by those in the shame condition compared to the guilt 
condition.  
For those in the shame induction, higher ratings on interpersonal traits were associated 
with a greater desire to maintain a current affective state. Greater desire to maintain an affective 
state was also related to higher ratings of effectiveness of their apology letter. This makes sense 
with what I hypothesized. The participants in the shame condition felt the most guilt; therefore 
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this relation shows that when people are feeling guilt, those that rate themselves higher on 
positive interpersonal traits also wish to remain in their affective state in order to write an 
apology letter. This is consistent with the instrumental view of emotion regulation (Tamir, 2009). 
This association shows that people are not always driven to reduce negative emotions. It suggests 
that people may be identifying with the positive interpersonal aspects of guilt and could be 
motivated to maintain their negative feelings in order to help them write an apology letter. These 
are simple correlations, but this suggests future research should continue to examine how guilt is 
regulated.  
The current study also found variables significantly related to guilt and shame proneness 
that have not been discussed in previous research. Higher scores on guilt proneness were related 
to higher ratings on interpersonal traits for those in the guilt emotion induction and control 
condition. This suggests that there is some relationship between a tendency to feel guilt and more 
positive self-evaluations. This finding is consistent with a more configural view of how affect is 
influencing judgments. If the tendency to feel guilt is related to more positive self-evaluations 
this suggests an incongruence approach to determining the influence of affect on self-judgments. 
The congruence approaches assume negative emotions leads to negative judgments. This finding 
suggests that may not be what is happening with guilt, and therefore guilt and guilt proneness 
should continue to be investigated using a configural approach, such as the Mood-as-Input model, 
that can account for occasions when the valence of an emotion is incongruent with the valence of 
the subsequent judgment.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 A major limitation to the current study was the emotion induction. Neither condition 
elicited significant feelings of shame and the manipulation designed to induce shame induced the 
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most guilt. Guilt and shame have been found to overlap. The current study attempted to design a 
manipulation that would allow for random assignment to a control, shame, and guilt condition. 
Perhaps future research could improve upon the manipulation by focusing on simply guilt or 
shame. It is possible that since shame is a negative self -evaluation, when recalling moral 
transgressions people avoid recalling and writing about things that they know will cause them to 
feel bad about themselves. Future studies could benefit from finding ways to induce shame and 
guilt in real time in the lab.   
Another potential limitation to the present research was the sample size. There were only 
approximately 25 people in each condition. The effect sizes for related affect induction studies 
are relatively small. A power analysis indicated that a sample size closer to 150 participants 
might be needed to find an effect. As a result of this, I plan on continuing data collection and 
reanalyzing the data at a later time. There were no significant differences on interpersonal trait 
ratings or desire to maintain affect for the control group compared to the combined guilt and 
shame group, but they was marginally significant. It is likely that collecting more participants (as 
originally planned) would allow me to determine whether these effects are reliable. If those in 
the combined guilt and shame group reported significantly higher ratings on interpersonal traits 
compared to the control group, this would support my hypothesis and the mood-as-input theory. 
If those in the guilt and shame combined group reported lower desire to maintain current feelings 
then this would be in support of the hedonic perspective of emotion regulation rather than the 
instrumental view.  
Concluding Remarks 
 Although the current study did not yield many significant findings, it has still made a 
valuable contribution to the literature. There is now some evidence as to whether or not guilt 
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influences self-enhancement. Present findings suggest that those that feel guilt do not self-
enhance. This finding could be limited by the small sample size of the study. Past research has 
shown that specific affective states such as happiness, sadness, and anger can influence 
judgments in congruent and incongruent ways and may be useful to maintain in certain contexts. 
Although I was unable to find evidence to support guilt and shame influencing judgments or 
being used in instrumental ways, the present study suggests that more research needs to be 
conducted to discover what affective states do have these effects.  
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State Shame and Guilt Scale 
 
The following are some statements which may or may not describe how you are feeling right 
now.  Please rate each statement using the 5-point scale below.  Remember to rate each 
statement based on how you are feeling right at this moment. 
 
  
                                                Not feeling       Feeling           Feeling          
                                       this way          this way          this way 
                                          at all          somewhat          very strongly 
 
 
1.  I feel good about myself. 1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
2.  I want to sink into the floor and disappear. 1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
3. I feel remorse, regret. 1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
4.  I feel worthwhile, valuable. 1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
5.  I feel small. 1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
6.  I feel tension about something I have done. 1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
7.  I feel capable, useful. 1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
8.  I feel like I am a bad person. 1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
9. I cannot stop thinking about something  
      bad I have done. 1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
10. I feel proud. 1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
11. I feel humiliated, disgraced. 1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
12. I feel like apologizing, confessing. 1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
13. I feel pleased about something I have done. 1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
14. I feel worthless, powerless.  1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
15. I feel bad about something I have done.  1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5   
 
Marschall, D. E., Sanftner, J. L., & Tangney, J. P. (1994) 
Appendix B 
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The Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale 
 
Instructions: In this questionnaire you will read about situations that people are likely to 
encounter in day-to-day life, followed by common reactions to those situations. As you read each 
scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate the likelihood that you would 
react in the way described. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Slightly 
Unlikely 
About 50% 
Likely 
Slightly 
Likely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
 
_______ 1. After realizing you have received too much change at a store, you decide to keep it 
because the salesclerk doesn't notice. What is the likelihood that you would feel uncomfortable 
about keeping the money?   
 
_______ 2. You are privately informed that you are the only one in your group that did not make 
the honor society because you skipped too many days of school. What is the likelihood that this 
would lead you to become more responsible about attending school?  
 
_______ 3. You rip an article out of a journal in the library and take it with you. Your teacher 
discovers what you did and tells the librarian and your entire class. What is the likelihood that 
this would make you would feel like a bad person?  
 
_______ 4. After making a big mistake on an important project at work in which people were 
depending on you, your boss criticizes you in front of your coworkers. What is the likelihood 
that you would feign sickness and leave work?  
 
_______ 5. You reveal a friend’s secret, though your friend never finds out. What is the 
likelihood that your failure to keep the secret would lead you to exert extra effort to keep secrets 
in the future? 
 
_______ 6. You give a bad presentation at work. Afterwards your boss tells your coworkers it 
was your fault that your company lost the contract. What is the likelihood that you would feel 
incompetent?  
 
_______ 7. A friend tells you that you boast a great deal. What is the likelihood that you would 
stop spending time with that friend?  
 
_______ 8. Your home is very messy and unexpected guests knock on your door and invite 
themselves in. What is the likelihood that you would avoid the guests until they leave?  
 
_______ 9. You secretly commit a felony. What is the likelihood that you would feel remorse 
about breaking the law?  
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_______ 10. You successfully exaggerate your damages in a lawsuit. Months later, your lies are 
discovered and you are charged with perjury. What is the likelihood that you would think you are 
a despicable human being?  
 
_______ 11. You strongly defend a point of view in a discussion, and though nobody was aware 
of it, you realize that you were wrong. What is the likelihood that this would make you think 
more carefully before you speak?  
 
_______ 12. You take office supplies home for personal use and are caught by your boss. What 
is the likelihood that this would lead you to quit your job? 
 
_______ 13. You make a mistake at work and find out a coworker is blamed for the error. Later, 
your coworker confronts you about your mistake. What is the likelihood that you would feel like 
a coward?  
 
_______ 14. At a coworker’s housewarming party, you spill red wine on their new cream-
colored carpet. You cover the stain with a chair so that nobody notices your mess. What is the 
likelihood that you would feel that the way you acted was pathetic?  
 
_______ 15. While discussing a heated subject with friends, you suddenly realize you are 
shouting though nobody seems to notice. What is the likelihood that you would try to act more 
considerately toward your friends? 
 
_______ 16. You lie to people but they never find out about it. What is the likelihood that you 
would feel terrible about the lies you told? 
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Appendix C  
BIS/BAS 
Each item of this questionnaire is a statement that a person may either agree with or disagree 
with.  For each item, indicate how much you agree or disagree with what the item says.  Please 
respond to all the items; do not leave any blank.  Choose only one response to each 
statement.  Please be as accurate and honest as you can be.  Respond to each item as if it were 
the only item.  That is, don't worry about being "consistent" in your responses.   
 
Choose from the following four response options: 
1 = very true           2 = somewhat true           3 = somewhat false             4 = very false 
       for me                    for me   for me                     for me 
 
1.  A person's family is the most important thing in life.    
2.  Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or nervousness.    
3.  I go out of my way to get things I want.    
4.  When I'm doing well at something I love to keep at it. 
  5. I'm always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun.    
6.  How I dress is important to me.    
7.  When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized.    
8.  Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit.    
9.  When I want something I usually go all-out to get it.  
  10.  I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun. 
11. It's hard for me to find the time to do things such as get a haircut.  
  12.  If I see a chance to get something I want I move on it right away.    
13.  I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me.    
14.  When I see an opportunity for something I like I get excited right away.    
15.  I often act on the spur of the moment.    
16.  If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty "worked up."    
17.  I often wonder why people act the way they do.    
18.  When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly.    
19.  I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something important.    
20.  I crave excitement and new sensations. 
21.  When I go after something I use a "no holds barred" approach.  
  22.  I have very few fears compared to my friends.    
23.  It would excite me to win a contest.  
  24.  I worry about making mistakes.     
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Items other than 2 and 22 are reverse-scored. 
BAS Drive:  3, 9, 12, 21   BAS Fun Seeking:  5, 10, 15, 20   BAS Reward Responsiveness:  4, 7, 
14, 18, 23 
BIS:  2, 8, 13, 16, 19, 22, 24 
Items 1, 6, 11, 17, are fillers.  
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Appendix D 
 
Religious Commitment Inventory-10 
 
Worthington Jr, E. L., Wade, N. G., Hight, T. L., Ripley, J. S., McCullough, M. E., Berry, J. 
W., ... & O'Connor, L. (2003). 
 
Directions: Using the 5-point scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to 
indicate how much you agree with it. 
 
1 = not at all true of me 
2 = somewhat true of me  
3 = moderately true of me 
4 = mostly true of me 
5 = totally true of me 
 
____ 1. I often read books and magazines about my faith.  
____ 2. I make financial contributions to my religious organization. 
____ 3. I spend time trying to grow in understanding of my faith. 
____ 4. Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about meaning 
in life. 
____ 5. My religious beliefs lie behind my whole approach to life.  
____ 6. I enjoy spending time with others of my religious affiliation. 
____ 7. Religious beliefs influence all my dealings in life. 
____ 8. It is important to me to spend periods of time in private religious thought and reflection. 
____ 9. I enjoy working in the activities of my religious organization. 
____ 10. I keep well-informed about my local religious group and have some influence in its 
decisions.  
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Appendix E 
 
Visualization Prompts  
 
We are interested in how well people are able to visualize events from their daily lives. We are 
going to have you visualize different types of events you’ve experienced and answer some 
questions about them. It is important that you try and visualize as many details as possible. 
Please respond as honestly.  
 
We would like you to think back to your most recent bus ride. With this situation in mind, please 
try to vividly relive this event and describe it in as accurate and detailed way as possible (i.e., in 
all its details). What happened on this bus ride? Imagine you are watching the scene in person. 
Include in your thoughts such details as to what your sensations were on the occasion and how 
you feel about it now.  
 
1. How vivid was your visualization?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
Vivid 
     Dull Slightly 
dull  
Neutral Somewhat 
vivid 
Vivid Very Vivid 
 
 
2. How clear was your visualization? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
Clear 
Unclear Slightly 
Unclear 
About 50% 
Clear 
Slightly 
Clear 
Clear Very Clear 
 
 
3. How difficult was your visualization? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Slightly 
Difficult 
Neutral Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very Easy 
 
 
4. How long ago did the event happen?  
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
 
Under a 
week ago 
About a 
month ago 
A few 
months 
ago 
Half a year 
ago 
Almost a 
year ago 
Over a 
year ago 
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We would like you to think about your local movie theatre. With this situation in mind, please 
try to vividly relive this scene and describe it in as accurate and detailed way as possible (i.e., in 
all its details). What happens at the movie theatre? Imagine you are watching the scene in person. 
Include in your thoughts such details as to what everything looks like, what sounds you hear, and 
any other sensations you typically experience.  
 
How vivid was your visualization?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at 
all 
Vivid 
Dull Slightly 
dull  
Neutral Somewhat 
vivid 
Vivid Very 
Vivid 
 
 
How clear was your visualization? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at 
all 
Clear 
Unclear Slightly 
Unclear 
About 
50% 
Clear 
Slightly 
Clear 
Clear Very 
Clear 
 
 
How difficult was your visualization? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Slightly 
Difficult 
Neutral Somewhat 
Easy 
Easy Very 
Easy 
 
 
How long ago did the event happen?  
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
 
Under 
a week 
ago 
About 
a 
month 
ago 
A few 
months 
ago 
Half a 
year 
ago 
Almost 
a year 
ago 
Over a 
year 
ago 
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Emotion Induction Prompts 
 
We are interested in how well people are able to visualize events in their daily lives. We are 
going to have you visualize different types of events and answer some questions about them.  
 
Shame Induction. We all fall short of our moral standards at times. We would like you to think 
back on a time when you felt shame after disappointing or hurting someone very close to you 
like a parent or friend. What did you do that you should not have done? With this situation in 
mind, please try to vividly relive this event and describe it in as accurate and detailed way as 
possible (i.e., in all its details). What happened to make you feel shame? What did you do that 
you knew was wrong? What did you think or feel in the situation? Include also such details as to 
what your sensations were on the occasion and how you feel about it now. Before you start 
writing, take a few moments to close your eyes and remember the event as clearly as possible. 
Remember that everything you write is completely confidential. You will have 10 minutes to 
write. Please write continuously for the full 10 minutes. 
 
For the first five minutes write about how you were feeling in this situation. How did you feel 
about the bus ride/the movie theatre/ doing this bad thing/failing to do the right thing? What was 
your general impression of the event? Do you remember feeling anything in particular while the 
event was happening or afterword? What sensations did you experience? The experimenter will 
tell you when to finish writing about this part of the visualization.  
 
For the second half of the visualization please write about why you were feeling that way. What 
explanation can you give for your experience? Was it common for you to feel this way? Why do 
you think you had these feelings? Write for the full five minutes including as much detail as 
possible.  
 
1. How vivid was your visualization?  
2. How clear was your visualization? 
3. How difficult was your visualization? 
4. How easy was it for you to think of a recent situation as we asked? 
5. How much effort did you put into visualizing this situation?  
6. Were you honest about what you wrote down?  
 
 
Guilt Induction. We all fall short of our moral standards at times. We would like you to think 
back on a time when you felt guilt after not being properly kind and caring towards someone 
very close to you like a parent or friend, resulting in hurt and disappointment. What did you fail 
to do that you knew you should have?  With this situation in mind, please try to vividly relive 
this event and describe it in as accurate and detailed way as possible (i.e., in all its details). What 
happened to make you feel guilt? What standard, value, or ideal didn’t you meet? What did you 
think or feel in the situation? Include also such details as to what your sensations were on the 
occasion and how you feel about it now. Before you start writing, take a few moments to close 
your eyes and remember the event as clearly as possible. Remember that everything you write is 
completely confidential. You will have 10 minutes to write. Please write continuously for the full 
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10 minutes. 
 
For the first five minutes write about how you were feeling in this situation. How did you feel 
about the bus ride/the movie theatre/ doing this bad thing/failing to do the right thing? What was 
your general impression of the event? Do you remember feeling anything in particular while the 
event was happening or afterword? What sensations did you experience? The experimenter will 
tell you when to finish writing about this part of the visualization.  
 
For the second half of the visualization please write about why you were feeling that way. What 
explanation can you give for your experience? Was it common for you to feel this way? Why do 
you think you had these feelings? Write for the full five minutes including as much detail as 
possible.  
 
7. How vivid was your visualization?  
8. How clear was your visualization? 
9. How difficult was your visualization? 
10. How easy was it for you to think of a recent situation as we asked? 
11. How much effort did you put into visualizing this situation?  
12. Were you honest about what you wrote down?  
 
Control. We would like you to think back to a day that you would describe as a typical weekday. 
With this situation in mind, please try to vividly relive this event and describe it in as accurate 
and detailed way as possible (i.e., in all its details). What happened on this typical day? What did 
you think or feel in the situation? Include also such details as to what your sensations were on the 
occasion and how you feel about it now. Before you start writing, take a few moments to close 
your eyes and remember the event as clearly as possible. Remember that everything you write is 
completely confidential. You will have 10 minutes to write. Please write for the full 10 minutes. 
 
For the first five minutes write about how you were feeling in this situation. How did you feel 
about the bus ride/the movie theatre/ doing this bad thing/failing to do the right thing? What was 
your general impression of the event? Do you remember feeling anything in particular while the 
event was happening or afterword? What sensations did you experience? The experimenter will 
tell you when to finish writing about this part of the visualization.  
 
For the second half of the visualization please write about why you were feeling that way. What 
explanation can you give for your experience? Was it common for you to feel this way? Why do 
you think you had these feelings? Write for the full five minutes including as much detail as 
possible.  
 
1. How vivid was your visualization?  
2. How clear was your visualization? 
3. How difficult was your visualization? 
4. How easy was it for you to think of a recent situation as we asked? 
5. How much effort did you put into visualizing this situation?  
6. Were you honest about what you wrote down? 
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Self-Traits 
 
10 Interpersonal traits  
caring 
charitable 
compassionate  
considerate  
generous 
kindhearted 
 moral  
nurturing  
respectful  
responsible 
 
10 agentic traits  
ambitious 
confident 
dominant 
go-getter 
independent 
leader 
original 
powerful 
self-reliant 
winner 
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Affect Regulation Prompts 
As an extension of the final visualization activity, we would now like you to write a letter to the 
person you imagined in the previous section.  
Guilt:  
Think about the person close to you that you were not properly kind and caring towards that 
resulted in hurt and disappointment. With that person in mind, write them a letter of apology 
describing what you think or feel about the situation where you failed to meet a certain standard, 
value or ideal. Remember that everything you write is completely confidential. You will not be 
giving this letter to anyone. It will just help with the aim of current research to assess 
visualization of everyday events. You will have 10 minutes to write. Please write continuously 
for the full 10 minutes. 
Shame: Think about the person close to you that you disappointed or hurt. With that person in 
mind, write them a letter of apology describing what you think or feel about the situation where 
you did something you should not have done. Remember that everything you write is completely 
confidential. You will not be giving this letter to anyone. It will just help with the aim of current 
research to assess visualization of everyday events. You will have 10 minutes to write. Please 
write continuously for the full 10 minutes. 
Control: Think about the person close to you that interact with on a daily basis. With that person 
in mind, write them a letter describing what you think or feel about your typical weekday. 
Remember that everything you write is completely confidential. You will not be giving this letter 
to anyone. It will just help with the aim of current research to assess visualization of everyday 
events. You will have 10 minutes to write. Please write continuously for the full 10 minutes. 
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Pre Letter Writing Questions (Desire to Maintain Affect) 
The following questions assess how you plan to prepare to complete the letter-writing task. 
Please circle the extent to which you plan to use each strategy on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much).  
1. To what extent do you plan to re-experience the infraction while writing the letter? 
2. How hard will you try to keep feeling the same way you are feeling now while writing 
the letter? 
3. How much do you want to stay in the same affective state as now?  
Post Letter Writing Questions (Secondary Self-Enhancement Measure) 
The following questions will assess the effectiveness of your letter. 
 How effective do you think your letter is in communicating your apology?  
 
1 
 
2 
 
     3 
 
    4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Completely 
Ineffective 
Ineffective  Slightly 
Ineffective  
Neutral Somewhat 
Effective 
Effective Very 
Effective 
 
How well do you think the victim would response to the letter if he or she were to read it? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Not 
well at 
all 
Not 
very 
well 
Neutral Well Extremely 
well 
 
How sincere do you think the letter sounds?   
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Very 
Insincere 
Insincere Slightly 
Insincere 
Neutral  Somewhat    
Sincere 
    Sincere Very 
Sincere 
 
Vita  
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